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erbert Marcuse’s oeuvre is driven by the recurring theme of 
“emancipation”—that is, the attempt to liberate man from social 
exploitation and the projection of an alternative society, a socialist 
society which Marcuse describes as “free, happy, and non-repressive.”1  This 
suggests that Marcuse saw the existing society as pathological and therefore it 
needs to be diagnosed and remedied.  His readings on Marx led him to his 
initial findings that the capitalist social order is the primordial cause of these 
pathologies, and, hence, it is the transformation of this social order that can 
bring emancipation to fruition.  Inasmuch as this struggle for emancipation 
requires an active political agent, a critical theorist is, therefore, bound to seek 
for this agent.  This is precisely what concerned Marcuse in his pre-World War 
II writings.  His theory of historicity, which straddles Heidegger, Hegel, and 
Marx, is a search for that viable political agent who can be the hope of 
emancipation.  Thus, Marcuse’s theory of historicity is premised, among other 
things, on the attempt to develop a theory of emancipation, and I call this 
“Marcuse’s first theory of emancipation.”   
Now, we may observe that after Marcuse devised a philosophical 
model of history that would secure the possibility of such agent of 
emancipation, his next task is to enunciate how this active political agent can 
actualize the project of liberation.  But after World War II, Marcuse was faced 
with a huge difficulty: the integration of the proletariat into the status quo as 
can be seen in the two defining events in contemporary German history, i.e., 
the defeat of the socialists in the German Revolution of 1918-19 and the 
support the German proletarians had for Hitler.  These events further 
convinced Marcuse (and the rest of the first generation of critical theorists like 
Benjamin, Horkheimer, and Adorno) that Marx’s proletariat is no longer the 
primary agent of emancipation.  In his analysis, Marcuse realized that the 
integration of the proletariat into the status quo had something to do with the 
advancement of technology that contributed to the dawning of the advanced 
                                                 
1 See Jeffry V. Ocay, “Heidegger, Hegel, Marx: Marcuse and the Theory of 
Historicity,” in KRITIKE: An Online Journal of Philosophy, 2:2 (December 2008), 46-64. 
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industrial society, a new type of society which reduces individuals into a state 
of “one-dimensionality.”   This forced Marcuse to renew his theory of 
emancipation through a critique of the advanced industrial society.  This paper 
attempts to address this issue.   
To have a full appreciation of Marcuse’s view on technology in the 
context of advanced industrial society, a preliminary discussion on the meaning 
of technology is provided here.  Thus, I begin my discussion with a working 
definition of technology.  In doing so, I refer to the work of Mario Bunge, 
which aptly sets the ground for any attempt to understand the dynamics and 
implications of technology, be they social, political, or economic.  I present 
succinctly his view on technology.   The next part deals with Marcuse’s notion 
of technology.  It centers on how technology, which is originally conceived as 
liberating, has become a tool for domination in the advanced industrial society.  
Finally, this section closes with a discussion on the Great Refusal, a term which 
Marcuse believes to be the most appropriate action the individuals need to 
combat all forms of control and domination and to attain emancipation. 
 
Technology Defined 
 
Technology is a very familiar term, yet it is a difficult concept to 
define.  As a matter of fact, there is no standing consensus as to what it really 
is.  The layman always equates technology with gadgets or “tools” in general, 
e.g., the spear, the compass, the automobile, the computer, the mobile phone, 
and the likes, while some philosophers, like Martin Heidegger, insists that 
technology cannot be defined.  According to Heidegger, what we understand 
about technology is only the truth which it has revealed.  Technology is simply 
a “way of revealing, bringing-forth”2 of what he calls “standing-reserve,” i.e., of 
truth, of Being.  Thus, for Heidegger, the best way to approach technology is 
to attune ourselves to the “Being” of technology. 
  For Mario Bunge, technology is a body of knowledge which is 
compatible with science and controllable by scientific method, and “can be 
employed to control, transform or create things or processes, natural or social, 
to some practical end deemed to be valuable.”3  Therefore, any practice-
oriented activity which employs the scientific method is, for Bunge, 
“technology.”  This coincides with the general notion of technology as the 
application of science.  In fact, for Bunge, technology is simply “applied 
science.”   
Applied science (technology) differs from pure science (science 
proper) in many respects.  Pure science attempts to seek truth for its own sake, 
while applied science aims for useful truth, truth for a practical purpose.4  
Whereas pure science wants to understand things better, applied science hopes 
                                                 
2 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. by William 
Lovitt (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1977), 12. 
3 Mario Bunge, “The Philosophical Richness of Technology,” in PSA: Proceedings of the 
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2 (1976), 154. 
4 Ibid., 158.  
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to improve its mastery over these things.5  While pure science involves 
conceptual knowledge, applied science involves skill or know-how.6  T h e  
notion of skill or know-how, that is, the practical ability and knowledge to do 
something is crucial here.  This gives us the impression that technology cannot 
simply be equated with gadgets or tools.  Technology as a know-how refers to 
those patterns of action, in a sense modes of thinking, which enable man to 
transform knowledge into means for meeting a particular end, e.g., basic 
human needs.  As Bunge asserts, technology involves “controlling,” 
“transforming,” and “creating.” 
While Bunge provides us correct and elemental definition of 
technology, Heidegger’s view that it is not yet “true” seems incontestable.   
There remains something essential that Bunge’s definition has not captured in 
the term “technology.”  But, for sure, it is neither Heidegger’s notion of 
“Being” as that which technology reveals.  Much more relevant here is the 
Marxist notion of technology as one of the main forces enabling contemporary 
capitalism to establish itself, and it is this alliance with capitalism that grants 
technology its power over individual minds and societies.  Douglas Kellner 
calls this alliance “techno-capitalism,” an alliance which “continues to attempt 
to monopolize new technologies in the interest of corporate domination and 
profitability, and thus continues to follow the imperatives of capitalist logic.”7  
Thus, there are two extra dimensions to technology explaining its power over 
modern humans: an anthropological element (captured in Marcuse’s 
Freudianism—control and domination as the fate of the human being in 
hostile nature) and the social-economic (modern capitalism).  Neither 
dimension is captured in a definition of technology solely in terms of applied 
science. 
In “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” Marcuse 
initially differentiates technology from technics.  The latter, defined as the 
instruments and practices of industry, transportation, communication, refers to 
the techniques of production and its produce, e.g., computers and automobiles, 
while Marcuse defines the former primarily “as a mode of production, as the 
totality of instruments, devices and contrivances which characterize the 
machine age and is thus at the same time a mode of organizing and 
perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent 
thought and behavior patterns, an instrument for control and domination.”8  
However, Marcuse later dismissed the difference between technology and 
technics.  In fact, we can notice that he uses these words interchangeably in his 
                                                 
5 Mario Bunge, “Technology as Applied Science,” in Technology and Culture, 7:3 
(Summer 1966), 330. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 182. 
8 Herbert Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” in Technology, 
War and Fascism, Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Vol. 1, ed. by Douglas Kellner (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1998), 41.  
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writings, especially in “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology” and 
One-Dimensional Man.   
Marcuse apprehends technology (or technics) both as a contrivance 
used in the production of goods, and as a social process which facilitates 
control and domination.  On the one hand, technology as a contrivance 
functions primarily as means of material production so that it will serve 
humanity in the procurement of basic needs for daily survival and in promoting 
convenient and gratifying existence.  On the other, technology as a social 
process refers to the organization of technics (such as the technical apparatus 
of industry), knowledge, skills and procedures for the purpose of attaining a 
specific desired end.  The concept technology or technics, therefore, has two 
dimensions in Marcuse: one where it is the simple sense analyzed by Bunge and 
the other having a deeper social sense.  While both notions characterize 
technology in general, it is the latter that eminently concerns Marcuse.  And, 
hence, it is technology as a social process which results from the systematic 
organization of tools for economic purposes that this paper adopts in 
appropriating Marcuse’s critique of advanced industrial society.   
  Sigmund Freud has argued that these technologies are determined by 
Ananke or necessity as scarcity.  In this way, technology appears to be 
necessary because it satisfies basic human needs, brings comfort to individuals, 
and disburdens their toil. But for Marcuse, there is another dimension to 
technology.  For him, technology can also be a tool for social control and 
domination, especially under capitalism. Indeed, technology under capitalism 
has become a type of social control which leads to self-destruction, thus 
invalidating the claim that technology exists only to serve humanity better.   As 
Marcuse argues, in the advanced industrial society, technology has become a 
new form of social control which demands total submission to the prevailing 
social order and which reduces the individuals into mere biological machines 
that respond to the technical processes in life.  But how does technology 
become a tool for domination?  Let us now turn to this issue. 
 
Technology as a Tool for Domination 
 
  Marcuse claims that technology is “value-neutral” because, in point of 
reference to its telos, it has no fixed value.  Technology is neither good nor bad.  
But this value-neutral technology has the propensity to become either good or 
bad; it has indeed the propensity to become a tool for emancipation and a tool 
for domination.  So the value ascribed to technology is completely dependent 
upon the motive of the user.  Therefore, if technology happens to be 
dominating, this is because the user has employed it in a wrong way, or if it 
happens to be liberating, understandably, the user has employed it in a right 
way.9  For Marcuse, it is crucial to understand this basic logic of technology in 
                                                 
9 For example, the mechanical engineer who designs an automobile might be thinking 
of the good of humanity, but he might otherwise be thinking of how such machine would look 
like to suit the taste of the customer, and the managers and the salesmen manipulate this  
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order to further comprehend its social import.  For him, technology in the 
advanced industrial society is dominating simply because it is organized by the 
administrators of this society to serve their very own interests.  In other words, 
it is the subjection of technology to politics and economics that turns 
technology into an instrument of domination.10  Let us discuss in detail how 
the capitalist social order has blocked individuals from attaining liberation via 
technological domination. 
Technological Rationality, False Needs, and Capitalism.  The capitalist mode 
of production which hinges primarily on modern technology has resulted in a 
new form of rationality—that is, technological rationality.  For Marcuse, 
technological rationality refers primarily to the assigning of mental powers to 
the apparatus that calls for unconditional compliance and coordination.11  In 
other words, technological rationality means the subordination of thoughts to 
the machine process so that it is no longer the individual that directs the 
machine but the other way around.   
  According to Marcuse, technological rationality arises when, in the 
medium of technology, culture, politics, and the increasing power of the 
economic system merge into an omnipresent system which swallows up or 
repulses all alternatives.12  This eventually “extends to all spheres of private and 
public existence,” integrating all authentic opposition and absorbing all 
alternatives.13  In this way, technology, which is originally an external power 
over nature, has been internalized by the individuals.  Here, reason has lost its 
meaning because the thoughts, feelings, and actions of men are shaped by the 
technical requirements of the apparatus which demands compliance and 
adjustment.14  Thus, the human psyche is transformed into mere biological 
impulses which make the individual a passive agent of production as well as 
reduce the individual into mere spectator who adjusts to the technical 
processes of production.  Consequently, technological rationality dissolves 
critical thinking and replaces it with the idea of compliant efficiency, which 
results in the individual’s submission to the apparatus without any form of 
mental and physical opposition.  Marcuse writes: “The world has been 
rationalized to such an extent, and this rationality had become such a social 
power that the individual could do no better than adjust himself without 
reservation”15  Marcuse further writes:   
 
The idea of compliant efficiency perfectly illustrates the 
structure of technological rationality.  Rationality is being 
transformed from critical force into one of adjustment 
                                                                                                                  
technology through massive and aggressive advertisements in the interest not of the humanity in 
general but maximum profit. 
10 See Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 234.  
11 Marcuse, “Some Social Implications,” 47. 
12 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, xvi. 
13 Ibid., 18. 
14 Marcuse, “Some Social Implication,” 49. 
15 Ibid., 45.   
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and compliance.  Autonomy of reason loses its meaning 
in the same measure as the thoughts, feelings and actions 
of men are shaped by the technical requirements of the 
apparatus which they themselves created.  Reason has 
found its resting place in the system of standardized 
control, production and consumption.  There it reigns 
through the laws and mechanisms which insure the 
efficiency, expediency and coherence of this system.16 
 
Under this prevailing rationality, there is no longer any place for 
reflection or autonomy since people are only given tasks to perform in 
accordance with the dictates of the apparatus.  Marcuse illustrates: 
 
A man who travels by automobile to a distant place 
chooses his route from the highway maps.  Towns, lakes 
and mountains appear as obstacle to be bypassed.  The 
countryside is shaped and organized by the highway: what 
one finds en route is the by-product or annex of the 
highway.  Numerous signs and posters tell the traveler 
what to do and think; they even request his attention to 
the beauties of nature or the hallmarks of history.  Others 
have done the thinking for him, and perhaps for the 
better.  Convenient parking spaces have been constructed 
where the broadest and most surprising view is open.   
Giant advertisements tell him when to stop and find the 
pause that refreshes.  And all of this is indeed for the 
benefit, safety and comfort; he receives what he wants.  
Business, technics, human needs and nature are wielded 
together into one rational and expedient mechanism.  He 
will fare best who follows its directions, subordinating his 
spontaneity to the anonymous wisdom which ordered 
everything for him.17  
 
Technological rationality has effectively and smoothly laid down its 
dominating power through the manipulation of needs.  It transforms social 
needs into the individual’s own thus creating attitudes which pushes the 
individual to obey the dictates of technology.  This leads to the creation of false 
needs.   
“False needs are those which are superimposed upon the individual by 
the particular interest in his repression.”18  In his early work “The Problem of 
Social Change in the Technological Society,” Marcuse argues that false needs 
are social needs imposed upon the individual in the interest of the society as a 
                                                 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid., 46. 
18 Marcuse, One-Dimensional, 5.   
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whole.19  No matter how gratifying these kinds of needs to the individual, 
Marcuse maintains that the satisfaction one gets from them is not a condition 
to be maintained and protected since this satisfaction is always defined in terms 
of its conformity to the prevailing social order.  Take for example the pleasure 
of owning a car.  For sure, it would be satisfying to own a car.  I can easily 
reach my workplace even if I am working many miles away from home.  I can 
travel conveniently to different places I want to visit.   With my car, I can spare 
myself from that boring and time consuming moment in the bus stop.  In 
general, I find satisfaction in my car because it allows me greater mobility.  But 
nowadays, it seems that the very purpose of the car is defeated.  The need for 
efficiency and convenience is replaced by the immediate need of 
“identification” with the social system as a whole.  The fact that an individual 
always replaces the model of his car as a response to a seductive advertisement 
or planned obsolescence strongly suggests that the car has become a false need, 
an instrument of domination.  The same principle goes to all other needs.  The 
spontaneous reproduction of these false needs makes the individual more 
insatiable and, thus, makes himself feel “…the need to buy a new automobile 
every other or third year, the need to relax before television...to eat enriched 
and soggy bread, the need to keep up with the neighbours.”20  This principle 
forces the individual to labor eight hours a day plus overtime, seven days a 
week, and four weeks a month just to meet the high standard of living set by 
the advanced industrial society, or the “consumerist society” as Marcuse puts 
it.  Here, “surplus repression” is the ultimate cause of the creation of false 
needs.  Thus, even if the individual finds greater satisfaction in this type of 
need, she remains locked up in a chain of technological repressions.  Marcuse 
avers: 
 
No matter how much such needs may have become the 
individual’s own, reproduced and fortified by the 
conditions of his existence; no matter how much he 
identifies himself with them and finds himself in their 
satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the 
very beginning products of a society whose dominant 
interest demand repression.21 
 
Marcuse now argues vehemently that the “consumerist society” is the 
principal culprit of the reduction of the individual to acquiescence, of the 
dissolution of the revolutionary class.  The “consumerist society” with its 
extremely high standard of living, which for Marcuse is the primordial form of 
control and domination in this society insofar as it is the direct offshoot of the 
systematic manipulation of technology, has silenced the individual and made 
                                                 
19 Herbert Marcuse, “The Problem of Social Change in the Technological Society,” in 
Towards a Critical Theory of Society, Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Vol. 2, ed. by Douglas Kellner 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 52. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 5.  
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him apathetic or hostile to the idea of dissent.
22  “Under the condition of a 
rising standard of living, non-conformity with the system itself appears to be 
socially useless, and the more so when it entails tangible economic and political 
disadvantages and threatens the smooth operation of the whole.”
23  T h e  
numbing effect of technology espoused with a high standard of living surely 
dissolves all forms of opposition in society.  For how could the people resist 
this society if domination which appears in the guise of affluence and liberty 
has intruded their entire being, from their psyche down to their very instincts?  
How else can they say “no” if they are enjoying the repressiveness of this 
system?   
Marcuse maintains that the administrators of this affluent consumerist 
society are hardly forced to justify their dominion because they deliver the 
goods; they satisfy the sexual and the aggressive energy of the people.
24  That is 
why Marcuse says that “It makes no sense to talk about liberation to free 
men…, it makes no sense to talk about surplus repression when men and 
women enjoy more sexual liberty than ever before.”
25  What is even worse is 
that the individuals in the affluent consumerist society associate unfreedom 
with poverty so that it would appear that it is only the poor who do not have 
freedom and those who enjoy the luxuries of life are called free.  The 
submission of the individuals to the system of control and domination in the 
advanced industrial society is a modern form of slavery.  If in ancient and 
medieval periods slavery is determined by forced submission, in the modern 
world it is exactly the opposite.  According to Marcuse, slavery today is done 
through voluntary submission or conformism.  In this manner, the individuals 
in the affluent consumerist society, or even those individuals in less developed 
societies who have adopted the values of the former, willingly but blindly 
cooperated with the administrators of social control and domination in the 
destruction of their own lives, resembling what is referred to in bioethics as 
“assisted suicide.” 
If we take a closer look at the dynamics of control and domination in 
the advanced industrial society, we may observe that the chasm between 
technological domination and political domination disappears.  Marcuse 
observes that technological rationality and political rationality are now 
indistinguishable, thus, domination is administration and administration 
domination.  In fact, Marcuse observes that at its most advanced stage, 
domination has functioned as administration.
26  “The domination (by the 
politicians) has been incorporated into the daily performances and relaxation of 
the citizens, and the “symbols” of politics are also those of business, 
                                                 
22 Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (London: Allen Lane The Penguin 
Press, 1972), 4.   
23 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 2. 
24 Herbert Marcuse, “Political Preface 1966,” in Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical 
Inquiry into Freud (United States of America: The Beacon Press, 1966), 11. 
25 Ibid., 12. 
26 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 255.  
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commerce, and fun.”
27  We may now talk about the mechanism, aside from the 
technological achievements, e.g., high standard of living, planned obsolescence, 
et cetera, that is responsible for this fusion, a mechanism that the advanced 
industrial society uses in effectuating a more subtle, more effective, and more 
efficient form of social control and domination: mass democracy. 
In mass democracy the people enjoy greater political freedom than 
ever before.  They determine their own leaders and participate in public affairs 
by casting their votes.  They may abstain from voting, or boycott a particular 
product. As a collective force, mass democracy can be an effective apparatus in 
bringing about genuine social change.  This should have been the essence of 
mass democracy.  But in a consumerist society, Marcuse contends, mass 
democracy has brought not freedom but total subjection of the people.  It has 
become the overarching mechanism of social control and domination.  The 
people believe that they are free but in reality they are not; they were basically 
repressed.  This is because right at the very heart of mass democracy in a 
consumerist society are the insatiable, consuming, and docile individuals who 
unconditionally obey to whatever the prevailing reality dictates.  Put differently, 
the masses succumb to their desires by introjecting the practical values of the 
consumerist society.  How is this made possible?  Marcuse believes that this is 
done through mass customization and massive and aggressive advertising.   
Mass customization efficiently works by producing large quantities of goods 
and services, most often beyond what is required, and tailoring these goods and 
services to the specific taste and capability of the masses.  The consumerist 
society has really all the types of goods and services that can be delivered to all 
classes of people.  No wonder that every attempt of the Filipino intelligentsia 
and other progressive groups to lobby their political reforms through mass 
protests fails because they lacked the support of the masses.  While these 
protesters were on the streets, the people’s attention was fixated on this 
anesthetic show “Wowowie” or other programs of the same kind.  Aside from 
all of this, we could also mention those exhilarating Hollywood movies, let 
alone the pornographic DVDs.  Obviously, through the application of 
technology in mass customization customers find exactly what they want, that 
is, the false needs imposed on them by the consumerist culture.  Is there 
something wrong with this culture?  If we accept that Marcuse’s analyses retain 
a kernel of truth today, then it would be possible to argue that there is really 
something wrong with this culture.  In the Philippines, for example, every time 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 103.  Philippine politics is a very peculiar case.  It might sound reasonable to 
some that during elections, all candidates resort to the mass media to make not their platforms 
but themselves known to the general public.  My worry is not that commercial advertisements in 
radios and televisions are overshadowed by political ads, not that actors are becoming politicians 
(in fact, the Philippine senate is infested with actors like former Senators Ramon Revilla, Sr., 
Ramon Revilla, Jr., Lito Lapid, Tito Sotto, and incumbent Senator Jinggoy Estrada who were 
busy filming while the senate was off session and who slept in the senate while not filming), but 
it is the fact that manufacturers are beginning to use politicians as commercial models—
politicians in the Philippines are becoming actors.  They are no longer treating their job seriously. 
Former Senator Juan Flavier, for example, was once endorsing a rubbing alcohol.  It is indeed 
quite hard to determine which one is politics and which one is business.  
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a food chain is established in their localities (of course it goes along with the 
construction of malls and other amenities), e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken, 
McDonald’s, or Greenwich, the Filipinos rejoice since they view these 
establishments as concrete signs of progress and development, without 
thinking that these will only make them continually hungry.  No wonder, 
obesity, which is one of the primary social problems in the U.S., is gradually 
becoming a serious problem in the Philippines.
28  The same principle goes to 
the proliferation of malls and parks.  The wide corridors and spacious alleys in 
malls draw large numbers of people, and the customized interior designs and 
the massive and aggressive displays of billboards forced shoppers to purchase 
goods which they do not need, or even do not plan to purchase.  Again, even if 
the technology of malls obviously bankrupts the people, still they viewed these 
entities as concrete signs of progress and development as they “create jobs,” to 
use the words of the politicians. 
If mass customization involves mass production of goods that suit the 
needs or, rather, desires of the individuals, massive and aggressive advertising 
makes these goods sell by linking them to the instincts of the masses.  In 
advertisements, the masses are made to desire things that they do not really 
need.29  Take for example a child who feels exhilarated upon seeing the big 
golden “M” of McDonald’s or the mascot of the happy bee of Jollibee; the big 
billboards of Chow King or KFC which make people feel hungry even if they 
are not; a gigantic drizzling image of coca cola during a hot summer day.  All of 
these bespeak of how the instincts are contrived in a way that reason is made 
to succumb to their overwhelming power.   
If it is mass customization and aggressive advertising that both make 
the products appealing to the public and persuade them to purchase, for 
Marcuse it is functional language and positivistic thinking that play the most 
                                                 
28 According to Jaime Pilapil, around two million Filipinos are now obese, which 
means they are most likely to have heart disease, diabetes, and suffer stroke.  Of the total 
population of Filipino women today, Pilapil adds, 20 percent are obese.  And what is alarming as 
Pilapil’s article evinces is that out of 10 deaths in the country today, 6 are caused by heart disease.  
To counter this alarming problem, Pilapil urges Filipinos to avoid fat-soaked fast food, such as 
Jollibee, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Mcdonald’s, Greenwich, and the like.  See Jaime Pilapil, “2M 
Filipinos are Overweight,” in Trade Union Congress of the Philippines <http://tucp-
ph.org/pmachine/comments.php?id=1198_0_1_0_C>, 18 January 2009.  Obesity problem in 
the Philippines does not only haunt the adult population.  Children are also victims of this 
problem.  The Philippine Social and Environmental News reports that Filipino children are also 
suffering from obesity.  The childhood obesity researchers are reporting more frequent cases of 
obesity-related diseases such as type 2 diabetes, asthma, and hypertension that once were 
considered adult conditions.  The report shows that the primary cause of obesity in children (and 
adults) in the Philippines is the Filipinos’ indiscriminate adoption of more western lifestyle and 
diet as reflected by the so-called fast food diet.  See “Philippine Social and Environmental 
News,” in Bayanihan <http://www.bayanihan.org/html/article.php/20040507114305566>, 18 
January 2009. 
29 If we recall Freud’s theory of instincts, Freud calls for the repression of the instincts 
simply because they are dangerous so that if released would lead to the destruction of society.  
But in mass democracy, these instincts are unleashed and afforded more freedom to 
indiscriminately and selfishly consume the goods they desire.  This is exactly what Marcuse calls 
“repressive desublimation.”  
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crucial role in this process.  Let us deal with these topics before proceeding to 
the discussion on the Great Refusal. 
Ordinary Language, Positivistic Thinking, and Technological Domination.  
Marcuse is convinced that the efficacy of technological domination is due 
primarily to the type of thinking that people have in the advanced industrial 
society and the kind of language that binds them together.  Thinking in the 
advanced industrial society, a society Marcuse describes as “one-dimensional,” 
is positivistic thinking that uses ordinary language.  This type of thinking is 
dangerous for Marcuse because it discourages critical thinking and looks only 
at that which is familiar, thus, the negative but redemptive dimension of 
thinking is kept apart.
30  Contrary to philosophic thinking which is critical and 
dialectical, positivistic thinking is affirmative and conformist.    This is because 
in positivism only things that can be experienced directly are considered real 
and those which are not directly observable are rendered unreal.  The 
positivists lock the meaning of the word by purging it, hence, any language or 
term that is not functional is for the positivists meaningless.  As a whole, 
positivistic thinking which uses functional language creates a kind of culture 
that affirms and legitimizes the dominant cultural values of the advanced 
industrial society.  This positivistic culture also quells the potential tendencies 
of human subjects to aim for something different, to represent a state of 
society beyond the existing one.
31 
When used as the medium of mass communication, e.g., in radio, in 
television, in newspapers, in magazines and as the medium of discourse in 
general, the ordinary language of the advanced industrial society binds people 
together, makes them speak the same language, and makes them desire the 
same goods and ideals.  In this way, ordinary language becomes a vehicle of 
control and domination.  It becomes functional.  In “Repressive Tolerance,” 
Marcuse argues that this language facilitates the smooth functioning of the 
entire repressive system.
32  Ordinary or functional language as the medium of 
discourse in the advanced industrial society predetermines “decisions” even 
before discourse happens so that what is happening is not real democratic 
discourse but a public announcement and imposition of “order.”
33  And what 
is peculiar in this society is that people may not believe in its mandate, or even 
do not care, and yet they act accordingly.
34  “One does not ‘believe’ the 
statement of an operational language but it justifies itself in action—in getting 
the jobs done, in selling and buying, in refusal to listen to others.”
35 
                                                 
30 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 178.  
31 See Douglas Kellner, “Marcuse, Art, and Liberation,” in Art and Liberation: Collected 
Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Vol. 4, ed.by  Douglas Kellner (London and New York: Routledge, 
2007), 26. 
32 Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1965), 94. 
33 Ibid., 97. 
34 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 103. 
35 Ibid.  
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The repressive nature of functional language is also evident in its 
“personal” character as it makes goods and services appear specially made “for 
you,” us.  We may see phrases in advertisements like “This is ‘your’ 
drugstore,”
36 or “Manila Hotel, ‘your’ home away from home,” or “Funeraria 
Gomez, ‘your’ funeral home,” or “The dress that makes ‘you’ look luscious.”  
If these goods and services are really my own, and if I am pleased with them, 
how can I say “no” to them?   How can the individual dissent if the 
repressiveness of the whole system enhances greater material satisfaction than 
ever before?   
In the political sphere, functional language reveals its dominating 
character when it becomes the language of Law and Order validated by the 
courts and the police.  According to Marcuse, this language does not only 
define and condemn the Enemy but also creates the Enemy.
37  And “…this 
creation is not the Enemy as he really is but rather as he must be in order to 
perform his function in the Establishment.”
38  As a result, the Enemy always 
appears as evil and everything it says is propaganda.  Take for example how the 
US and British governments produce the image of the Islamic world as “axis of 
evil” by associating its identity with violence, e.g., suicide bombings.  Today, 
the term Islam or Muslim appears to have become identical with the term 
“terrorist.”  To take another example, contemporary this time to Marcuse, he 
was particularly struck by the Vietnam War. For him, many of us who had 
watched movies about the Vietnam War would have had despised the Viet 
Cong and lauded the Americans. One of the reasons is that the Viet Cong 
attacked the Americans during the dead of the night and killed American 
soldiers, while the Americans only attacked in broad daylight and didn’t disturb 
the sleep of the enemy.
39 When this was publicized, especially in broadcast 
media, the result was that people in the world sympathized with the Americans.   
The abbreviation of terms is something that also struck Marcuse as a 
sign of the functionalization of language.  It is one of the cunning techniques 
of the advertisement industry to repress the questioning mind of the people.
40  
Marcuse writes: “NATO does not suggest what North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization says, namely, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which case 
one might ask questions about the membership of Greece and Turkey.”
41  
“The abbreviation denotes that the meaning is fixated, doctored, loaded.  Once 
it has become a vocable, constantly repeated in general usage, ‘sanctioned’ by 
the intellectuals, it has lost all cognitive value and serves merely for recognition 
of an unquestionable act.”
42  Marcuse also says: 
 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 92.  
37 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 
1969), 74. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 75. 
40 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 93. 
41 Ibid., 94. 
42 Ibid.  
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The telescoping and abridgement of syntax which cuts off 
development of meaning by creating a fixated images 
which impose themselves with an overwhelming and 
petrified concreteness is a well-known technique of the 
advertisement industry, where it is methodically used for 
“establishing an image” which sticks to the mind and to 
the product, and helps to sell the men and the goods.
43 
 
The above discussion finally explains in full why and how technology 
has become a tool for control and domination in advanced industrial society 
vis-à-vis mass democracy, mass customization, massive and aggressive 
advertising, functional language, and positivistic thinking.  Let us now proceed 
to the discussion on how Marcuse addresses this issue. 
 
Technology as a Tool for Emancipation 
 
Though Marcuse believes that technology becomes the new form of 
social control and domination in the advanced industrial society, he is not 
saying that domination necessarily follows whenever there is technology.  For, 
in the first place, technology can also be a very decisive tool for emancipation, 
especially in liberating humanity from material necessity.  In One-Dimensional 
Man, Marcuse maintains that it is not technology that is to blame for the 
enslavement of man and the perpetuation of the struggle for existence but the 
way in which men treat technology and the way they organized societal labor.44  
And he echoes this conviction in his work An Essay on Liberation.  He puts it 
interrogatively: “Is it still necessary  to state that not technology, not technique, 
not the machine are the engines of repression, but the presence, in them, of the 
masters who determine their number, their life span (planned obsolescence), 
their power, their place in life, and the need for them?”45  He adds: 
Is it still necessary to repeat that science and technology 
are the great vehicles of liberation and that it is only their 
use and restriction in the repressive society which makes 
them into vehicle of domination?  Not the automobile is 
repressive, not the television is repressive, not the 
household gadgets are repressive, but the automobile, the 
television, the gadgets which, produced in accordance 
with the requirements of profitable exchange, have 
become part and parcel of the people’s own existence, 
own “actualization.” 
46 
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This means that domination comes into the fore when technology is 
used for the maintenance of the capitalist system.  It is, therefore, technological 
rationality rather than technology itself that defines the overwhelming power of 
domination.  Insofar as technological rationality is historical by nature, this 
means that men can always reshape society to their advantage and carry out the 
project of emancipation by redirecting the course of technology, that is, by 
switching from technological rationality to a kind of rationality that promotes 
freedom and happiness.  But given the fact that the power of technological 
domination is so formidable in the advanced industrial society, would there be 
any chance for the dawning of the project of emancipation?  And if the answer 
is in the positive, by what means can it be achieved? 
Marcuse always believes that emancipation is attainable and the means 
is practicable.  However, he admits that it is a task which is almost completely 
bereft of hope.  As a matter of fact, Marcuse becomes quite pessimistic 
towards the end of One-Dimensional Man.  He observes that the chance of the 
historical alternative, that is to say, of radical social change is bleak.  The more 
the advanced industrial society delivers the goods and alleviates the burden of 
life the more “refusal” becomes unreasonable.
47  B u t  t h i s  m o m e n t  o f  
despondency did not push Marcuse to the brink of hopelessness.  As he has 
reached the point of no return, the struggle goes on. 
The Great Refusal.  Marcuse understands the Great Refusal as a kind of 
“negativity” both in thought and action which enables the individuals to 
transform their present needs, sensibility, consciousness, values, and behaviour 
into a new radical sensibility, a sensibility that does not tolerate injustice and 
that which resists and opposes all forms of control and domination.  Douglas 
Kellner contends that for Marcuse, the Great Refusal is a political 
individualistic refusal and revolt against the system of domination and 
oppression exacted by the bourgeois society.
48  But despite the fact that 
Marcuse emphasizes individualistic refusal and revolt, the Great Refusal is in 
the end a “collective refusal and revolt” aimed both at overthrowing the system 
of domination and oppression and the realization of a radical total social 
change, the realization of a socialist, non-repressive, free, and happy society.  In 
One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse avers that it is only the Great Refusal that 
expresses a “truly revolutionary mode of opposition.”
49 
Why the Great Refusal? If we rehearse here Marcuse’s psychoanalytic 
turn, he argues that Ananke or the reality principle is no longer necessary.
50  
The need to work long and hard in order for man to survive or for civilization 
to thrive has been invalidated by the very achievements of the advanced 
industrial society.  This society has reached a stage of necessary abundance 
wherein people are no longer obliged to work long and hard, but work less and 
                                                 
47 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 255. 
48 Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (London and Berkley: 
MacMillan Press and University of California Press, 1984), 279. 
49 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 255. 
50 See Jeffry Ocay, “Eroticizing Marx, Revolutionizing Freud: Marcuse’s 
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enjoy more.  But Marcuse observes that the capitalist mode of production and 
organization has retained Ananke by replacing the “reality principle” with the 
“performance principle.”  The performance principle manipulates instinctual 
desires through the creation of false needs as soon as the old ones are satisfied, 
thus making individuals in the capitalist society to work more and perform 
well.  And the capitalist society has effectively done this through the 
privatization of industries where profits gravitate only to the few, the 
valorization of social virtues like “hard work” and success through 
competition, and the reward system, e.g., giving incentives and commissions to 
top-performing employees, giving plaque of recognition to employees for 
being dubbed as the “employee of the month,” or “employee of the year,”  or 
“faculty of the year,” and giving tokens, for example a golden ring, to loyal 
employees for reaching 10 or 15 years of service (or rather 10 or 15 years of 
servitude?).  The point Marcuse would like to show is that “surplus repression” 
which is created by the capitalist society is absolutely unnecessary, thus, it has 
to be “refused”; the individuals in the advanced industrial society must say 
“NO” to this surplus repression.  This is precisely the raison d’ê·tre of the Great 
Refusal.  
The Great Refusal is not simply an act of refusal for refusal’s sake.  As 
I have argued above, the Great Refusal is above all a struggle towards 
emancipation.  It is a struggle towards the realization of a socialist, non-
repressive, free, and happy society where people are freed from technological 
domination and at the same time enjoying the free play of their faculties.
51  
And indeed enjoy the benefits from modern industry and technology.  This 
kind of liberation for Marcuse is primarily liberation of the senses from 
reification.  He calls it “radical sensibility.”  Marcuse believes that the senses are 
central in the process of liberation because .”..the emancipated senses would 
repel the instrumentalist rationality of capitalism while preserving and 
developing its achievements.”
52  He believes that “…the senses do not only 
‘receive’ what is given to them, in the form in which it appears, they do not 
‘delegate’ the transformation of the given to another faculty (the 
understanding); rather, they discover or can discover by themselves, in their 
‘practice’, new (more gratifying) possibilities and capabilities, forms and 
qualities of things and can urge and guide their realization.”
53  But Marcuse’s 
understanding of the term “senses” does not only refer to the internal and 
external organs as organs of perception.  Rather, the term “senses” refer to the 
human body as a whole and also includes rationality.
54  Thus, the phrase 
“liberation of the senses” means “liberation of the human body.”  This is 
because the direct object of technological domination is precisely the human 
                                                 
51 For Marcuse, technological domination is the leading form of social control and 
domination in the advanced industrial society where “reification” and “alienation of labor” are 
retained.  Thus, when we say “technological domination” it means the conglomeration of all 
forms of social control and domination through the mediation of technology. 
52 Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, 64. 
53 Ibid., 17. 
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body.  Inasmuch as technological domination exploits the body through 
reification, and if reification of the senses is the ultimate cause of the 
subjection of man, then it is the liberation of the senses that would bring 
rupture with this continuum of control and domination in the advanced 
industrial society.  It is the liberation of the senses that would engender a free 
and happy society.  Thus, Marcuse insists that to liberate humanity, the 
liberation of the senses should come first.
55  And he adds: “It is this primary 
experience of the senses itself which must change radically if social change is to 
be radical, qualitative change.”
56   
The first step necessary for the realization of this kind of liberation is 
the reduction of the number of working hours to the minimum or even 
abolishing human work through complete automation, that is, letting the 
machine do the work on behalf of the workers.  Marcuse argues: “The 
reduction of the working day to a point where the mere quantum of labor time 
no longer arrests human development is the first requisite of freedom.”
57  
When this moment is reached, then man begins to see the dawn of liberation 
because “surplus repression” is removed.  But this requires first and foremost 
the Great Refusal. 
Marcuse portrays “liberation” through the images of the Greek gods 
Orpheus and Narcissus.  Orpheus is an archetype of a poet as liberator who 
establishes a higher order in the world, an order without repression and a 
creator who brings peace and salvation by pacifying man and nature, not 
through force but through song; Orpheus’s language is song and his work play, 
while Narcissus is the symbol of beauty, of art; his life is that of beauty and his 
existence is contemplation.
58 In the persons of Orpheus and Narcissus, art, 
freedom, and culture are eternally combined.  Unlike Prometheus who 
symbolizes toil, productivity, and progress through repression, Orpheus and 
Narcissus symbolize work as play.
59  Unlike Prometheus who curses Pandora 
(the female principle which symbolizes sexuality and pleasure) because her 
beauty and the happiness she promises are fatal to work and civilization; 
Orpheus and Narcissus, on the other hand, celebrate sexuality.
60  Orpheus and 
Narcissus reconcile Eros and Thanatos; they celebrate the body and refuse to 
succumb to the performance principle.  The Orphic and Narcissistic images are 
indeed symbols of the Great Refusal—a refusal to the order of repression, a 
refusal which aims at liberation.
61  Marcuse cites Margaret Mead’s 
interpretation of the Arapesh culture to further describe the world of Orpheus 
and Narcissus, a world that is not to be mastered and dominated but as a 
garden which can grow alongside the growth of human beings: 
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To the Arapesh, the world is a garden that must be tilled, 
not for one’s self, not in pride and boasting, not for 
hoarding and usury, but that the yams and the dogs and 
the pigs and most of all the children may grow.  From 
this whole attitude flow many of the other Arapesh traits, 
the lack of conflict between the old and the young, the 
lack of any expectation of jealousy and envy, the 
emphasis on cooperation.
62 
 
Marcuse’s notion of the Great Refusal as the most appropriate and 
practicable means to address the problem of social control and domination has 
taken many forms.  We can notice this in the switching of tone in his works 
from One-Dimensional Man down to his last work the Aesthetic Dimension.  In One-
Dimensional Man, “Repressive Tolerance,” and An Essay on Liberation, Marcuse 
advocates confrontation politics, while in his Counterrevolution and Revolt, he 
advocates United Front among the New Left.  And, finally, in The Aesthetic 
Dimension, Marcuse resorts to “art” and argues that “art” is the ultimate form of 
the Great Refusal.  While some scholars argue that Marcuse’s The Aesthetic 
Dimension abandons the idea of confrontation politics and United Front, I 
believe the contrary.  The shift from confrontation politics to United Front 
then finally to art is necessary for Marcuse because the social condition 
changes.  The change of tactic, therefore, is not to be viewed as an act of 
abandonment of previous strategies.  It is basically a renewal of this tactic to 
suit the demand of the time.  And so I argue that this is exactly what Marcuse 
did, and in doing so, I believe he retains the negating aspects of “confrontation 
politics” and “United Front.” 
For sure, the Great Refusal is a call for “revolution” which is necessary 
in the sense that liberation requires a rupture in history and this rupture can 
only be done through revolution.
63  But it must be noted that Marcuse does 
not favour violence or bloody revolution.  The kind of revolution that he 
envisions is completely different from what we have witnessed in history, for 
example, the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Long 
March in China.  This revolution is carried forward not by armed individuals 
but by the individuals of “new sensibility.”  This revolution is 
 
...driven by the vital need to be free from the 
administered comforts and the destructive productivity of 
the exploitative society, freed from smooth heteronomy, a 
revolution which, by virtue of this “biological” 
foundation, would have the chance of turning 
quantitative technical progress into qualitatively different 
ways of life—precisely because it would be a revolution 
occurring at a high level of material and intellectual 
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development, one which would enable man to conquer 
scarcity and poverty.
64  
 
In  Counterrevolution and Revolt, Marcuse argues that this revolution 
involves the “new sensibility,” i.e., the transformation of the cultural and 
material basis of the society, the needs and aspirations of the individuals, and 
their consciousness and sensibility.
65  This “new sensibility” is revolutionary 
because it militates against technological domination.  It militates against the 
numbing effect of the functional language of the consumerist society and at the 
same time shatters the kind of “false consciousness” that this language 
engenders.  However, as there are always exceptions to the rule, Marcuse 
accepts, albeit hesitantly, the possibility of violent revolt.  In “Repressive 
Tolerance,” Marcuse writes: 
 
If they (the oppressed and overpowered minorities) use 
violence, they do not start a new chain of violence but try 
to break an established one.  Since they will be punished, 
they know the risk, and when they are willing to take it, 
no third person, and at least of all the educators and 
intellectuals, has the right to preach them abstention.
66  
 
And when asked whether violent revolt would bring any good, he 
answers: 
 
With all the qualification of the hypothesis based on an 
‘open’ historical record, it seems that the violence 
emanating from the rebellion of the oppressed classes 
broke the historical continuum of injustice, cruelty, and 
silence for a brief moment, brief but explosive enough to 
achieve an increase in the scope of freedom and justice, 
and a better and more equitable distribution of misery 
and oppression in a new social system—in one word: 
progress in civilization.
67 
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With this novel form of revolution, the Marxist notion of “proletariat” 
as the sole agent of radical change has been disqualified.  This now justifies 
Marcuse’s claim, which I have discussed in the early part of this paper, that it is 
the individual who is disposed to radical action who can be the agent of 
revolution—the individual with the new sensibility.  This individual is not the 
ascetic individual, the asocial and apolitical Dasein of Heidegger, but the 
politically conscious individual.  And when this politically conscious individual 
forms alliance with other individuals of the same consciousness, a “collective 
radical action” ensues.  Marcuse calls this alliance the New Left.  This New 
Left is not a single organization with the same ethos like the Communist Party 
of the Philippines or the National Liberation Fronts in general.  Rather, it 
refers to the different minority groups like the students’ movement, women’s 
movement, labor unions, and other politically inclined groups that struggle for 
liberation.  For Marcuse, these forces are concrete expressions of the Great 
Refusal because they define the limits of the established societies and signal the 
impending rupture of history.
68   
Because control and domination in the advanced industrial society has 
become an overwhelming force that debilitates the individual, Marcuse insists 
that it must be shattered, and this can be done only through radical politics, a 
political practice of methodical disengagement from and refusal of the 
established society.
69  “Such a practice involves a break with the familiar, the 
routine ways of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding….”
70  Thus, the New 
Left, which for Marcuse is the only possible counterforce in the advanced 
industrial society, must “…assume the vast task of political education, 
dispelling the false and mutilated consciousness of the people so that they 
themselves experience their condition, and their ambitions, as vital needs and 
apprehend the ways and means of their liberation.”
71  Thus, the revolution 
driven by the new sensibility must be brought to the political arena; however, it 
is both a political and a cultural struggle.  This is now what Marcuse would 
have us do: refuse, resist, and repel technological control and domination.  The 
Great Refusal is indeed expressed in this way. 
Despite the fact that Marcuse has a slight slant in favor of violent 
revolt, he made it very clear that in a highly advanced society this tactic should 
not be employed.  A struggle which attempts to seize power directly from the 
centers of political control, Marcuse says, should not be resorted to because in 
                                                                                                                  
the Chinese Revolution, otherwise known as the Long March of 1934 that installed Mao Zedong 
as the first President of the People’s Communist Republic of China, but no one can deny the 
fact that it is the nationalization of the major industries, which were previously owned by foreign 
companies, that boosted the economy of China during the second half of the 20th century.  
China’s economic successes today (although there are downturns because of the recent global 
economic crunch) can be partly or, rather, mostly, attributed to the economic policies of the 
revolutionary government of Mao Zedong.   
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the advanced industrial society the military and police power have been so 
organized in the hands of an effectively functioning government, thus, the 
chance of winning is a remote possibility.
72  And, more importantly, such tactic 
surely would not draw support from the working class due primarily to the 
prevalence of reformist consciousness among them.
73  What is the alternative?  
The best alternative, Marcuse maintains, is the “…control of the mode of 
production, a redirection of the mode production toward the satisfaction of the 
senses and imagination of the individuals.  This would weaken the 
Establishment and eventually leads to its demise and the triumph of 
socialism.”
74  And this alternative is found in “art.”   
Art as the Ultimate form of the Great Refusal.  It might appear, as some 
scholars argue, that Marcuse had abandoned his advocacy of confrontation 
politics and United Front in the 1960s and early 1970s and resorted to art in 
the late 1970s.  But this assumption does not hold water.  While it is true that 
Marcuse considers “art” to be the ultimate form of the Great Refusal, any 
assumption that he had put this argument only in his last work The Aesthetic 
Dimension would do injustice to Marcuse.  As early as the writing of Eros and 
Civilization in early 1950s, Marcuse had already claimed that “art” is the ultimate 
form of the Great Refusal.  Marcuse writes:  “This Great Refusal is a protest 
against unnecessary repression, the struggle for the ultimate form of 
freedom—‘to live without anxiety’.   But this idea could be formulated without 
punishment only in the language of art.”
75  In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse 
repeats this claim.  He said that art has the power of negation,
76 and, in its most 
advanced form, it is the Great Refusal—the refusal of that which is.
77  The 
same argument is found in An Essay on Liberation: “The Great Refusal, which is 
the ‘new sensibility’, is the ascent of the life-instincts over aggressiveness and 
guilt.”
78  This again is best incarnated in the work of art.  And in 
Counterrevolution and Revolt, Marcuse argues again that emancipation requires the 
language of art.
79  What I would like to argue here is that “art” as the ultimate 
form of the Great Refusal is the very form of the political struggle for 
liberation.  Again, I argue that Marcuse never abandons his advocacy of 
“radical politics.”  What Marcuse does is amplify radical politics by giving it its 
form: art.  With this, we could rightly infer that art and radical politics go hand 
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remains a revolutionary class.  The power to subvert the oppressive society lies dormant in their 
very consciousness but so ripe for explosion once ignited.   
74 Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, 43. 
75 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 125. 
76 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 62. 
77 Ibid., 63. 
78 Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, 23-24. 
79 Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, 79.  
 
 
74     TECHNOLOGY, TECHNOLOGICAL DOMINATION 
 
in hand in the struggle for liberation.  It is art that gives the form of a socialist, 
non-repressive, free, and happy society, while it is radical politics that realizes 
this vision.   
Because liberation for Marcuse is the liberation of the senses, that is, 
liberation of the “body,” from false consciousness or reification, then there is 
no other form that could actualize this notion of liberation than art itself.   
“Against all fetishism of the productive forces, against the continued 
enslavement of individuals by the objective conditions (which remain those of 
domination), art represents the ultimate goal of all revolutions: the freedom 
and happiness of the individual.”
80  How does art do this?  First, art has the 
political potential of indicting and subverting the established order through a 
refusal to obey its language, its order, its conventions, and its images,
81 and; 
second, art invokes the beautiful image of liberation as can be seen in 
Marcuse’s portrayal of the world of Narcissus and Orpheus as one of joy and 
fulfillment, a world where work has become play and Eros is released from 
repression.
82 For Marcuse, this is the precondition of the liberation of the 
senses.  This is based on the four-fold true functions of art, namely: 1) to 
negate the present condition of society, 2) to anticipate the trends of the future, 
3) to criticize destructive or alienating trends, and 4) to suggest “images” of 
creative non-alienating trends.
83  In other words, art negates the prevailing 
system of control and domination because it awakens and enlightens the 
repressed rationality and sensibility of man.  Art projects the “beautiful” image 
of liberation and directs these repressed rationality and sensibility to this state 
of affairs.  In this way, art becomes a revolutionary factor (but not as an 
instrument of revolution) which breaks the mystified and petrified social reality 
and opens the horizon of change, of liberation.
84  This would logically 
terminate “…in the emergence of another reason, another sensibility, which 
defy the rationality and sensibility incorporated in the dominant social 
institutions.”
85  Thus, liberation of the senses also entails the liberation of 
reason.  This kind of reason and sensibility which Marcuse describes as 
“sensuous reason” and “rational sensuousness”
86 is the true image of liberation 
and is possible only through genuine art.  In a dialogue with Richard Kearney, 
Marcuse says: 
                                                 
80 Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1979), 69. 
81 Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, The Phenomenological 
Tradition (London: Manchester University Press, 1984), 74. 
82 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 133-144. 
83 Ibid., 76-77. 
84 Marcuse, Aesthetic Dimension, xi. 
85 Ibid., 7. 
86 See Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 148.  “Sensuousness is a Marcusean term which 
denotes the liberation of the senses.  The phrases “sensuous reason” and “rational 
sensuousness” are for Marcuse the principle of a non-repressive society.  Reason here is no 
longer viewed as instrumental, that is to say, as instrument of domination, but one that is united 
with the senses.  Unlike the Platonic psychology where reason denounces and represses the 
instincts, in rational sensuousness reason is alloyed with the instincts in the celebration of Eros.  
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I believe that you cannot have the liberation of human 
sensitivity and sensibility without a corresponding 
liberation of the rational faculty…of man.  Any liberation 
effected by art signifies therefore, a liberation of both the 
senses and reason from their present servitude.
87 
 
Now, if we recall the discussion on Marcuse’s engagement with 
Freud’s theory of instincts, we notice that Marcuse insists that Eros must not 
be repressed through the postponement of its gratification so that mind and 
body, reason and the senses would become the vehicles of liberation.  Art as 
the ultimate form of the Great Refusal is logically connected to this.  The 
projection of the “beautiful” image of liberation is basically the affirmation and 
celebration of Eros, of the life-instincts and at the same time accord them 
immediate gratification.  The non-repressive, free, and happy image of the 
world of Orpheus and Narcissus is, therefore, the hidden meaning of the 
notion of “liberation of the senses.”  This now completes the answer to the 
question why art is the ultimate form of the Great Refusal. 
At first glance, it looks as if art is an instrument of radical politics.  But 
Marcuse warns us that art cannot be united with radical politics.  Art and 
radical politics are two different things.  Art and radical politics work in a 
dialectical fashion—art gives radical politics its form, while radical politics gives 
art its content, and this dialectic is permanent.  As I have mentioned above, art 
only gives the form of a non-repressive, free, and happy society, which means 
that art cannot translate its vision into reality, whereas it is radical politics that 
realizes this vision.  If art is the ultimate form of the Great Refusal, why not 
use art as an instrument of radical politics, as a political instrument in the 
struggle for liberation, e.g., using art as propaganda?  This is dangerous for 
Marcuse because art in this manner is standardized art and becomes 
ideological; it loses its negating power.  When art is used as an instrument to 
effect mass conversion of sensibility and consciousness, art abuses its four-fold 
true functions.
88  That is why Marcuse disagrees with Walter Benjamin who 
urges that popular art or mass culture, particularly the cinema, should be used 
as a political instrument in a socialist revolution.
89   
The idea that art and radical politics work in a dialectical fashion 
signifies that the struggle for liberation is permanent.  There is not one single 
moment wherein art has attained its ultimate goal and man ceases to do radical 
politics.  What Marcuse believes is that once liberation of the senses is attained, 
new forms of problems may arise, and so on.  Thus, art and radical politics 
shall eternally posit their negating power.  Marcuse puts it brilliantly: 
 
                                                 
87 Kearney, Dialogues, 75.  
88 Ibid., 76. 
89 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age Mechanical Reproduction,” cited in 
Jonathan Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent (Edinbugrh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2003), 131.  
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Art and politics will never finally coalesce because the 
ideal society which art strives for in its negation of all 
alienated societies presupposes an ideal reconciliation of 
opposites, which can never be achieved in any absolute or 
Hegelian sense.  The relationship between art and 
political praxis is therefore dialectical.  As soon as one 
problem is solved in a synthesis, new problems are born 
and so the process continues without end.  The day when 
men try to identify opposites in an ultimate sense, thus 
ignoring the inevitable rupture between art and 
revolutionary praxis, will sound the death-knell for art.   
Man must never cease to be an artist, to criticize and 
negate his present self and society and to project by 
means of his creative imagination alternative “images” of 
existence.  He can never cease to imagine for he can 
never cease to change.
90 
 
Finally, we may now talk about technology as a tool for emancipation.  
In order for technology to be a tool for emancipation, it has to reconstruct its 
direction and goal in accord with the “new sensibility”—the demands of 
Eros.
91  Then the liberated consciousness made possible by the dialectical 
interplay between art and radical politics would promote a kind of technology 
that is free to project and design an image of human existence without 
exploitation and toil.
92  The automation or even complete automation that 
technology promises would make this happen.  Man no longer needs to work 
long and hard, but work less and enjoy more.  With this, things would become 
easier and prettier to man and at the same time would satisfy all his vital needs.  
And when this happens man would be free to pursue the things necessary for 
the attainment of his “complete being.”  Here, man truly enjoys the free play of 
his faculties, the very condition that “art” dreams of.  In this way, technology 
assumes the features of art, especially the beautiful image of liberation it 
promises.   But, again, for Marcuse, all of this can be brought to fruition if and 
only if the individuals in the advanced industrial society practice the Great 
Refusal. 
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